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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal design of delegation rule in a three-tier principal-
intermediary-agent hierarchy. In this hierarchy, monetary transfer is not
feasible, delegation is made sequentially, and all players are strategic. We
characterize the optimal delegation mechanism. It is shown that the single-
interval delegation a la Holmstrom is optimal only when the intermediary
is moderately biased. Otherwise, as responses to the distortion caused by a
biased intermediary, the optimal delegation set may involve a hole. Thus,
multi-interval delegation set would arise when subordinates have opposing
biases. This result sheds some light on policy threshold e¤ects: "slight"
changes in the underlying state cause a jump in the policy responses.
Key words: Delegation, Intermediary, Hierarchies
JEL classication codes: D73, D78, D86
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the optimal design of delegation rule in a three-tier
principal-intermediary-agent hierarchy. In this environment, all players are
strategic, the principal cannot directly contract with the informed agent,
and contingent monetary transfers are not feasible. For instance, the current
policy-maker need to a¤ect the behavior of future executives by restricting
the choice set of the future policy-maker, whose interest might di¤er due to
political turnover or shocks on preferences, etc.; delegation can be made only
among certain parties within a multi-tier government; corporate headquarters
need to command product-line managers via division managers. Following
Tirole (1986) and McAfee and McMillan (1995), we will take the multi-tier
hierarchy as granted, and highlight the implications of hierarchies on the
optimal design of delegation rule.
It is well known that when a principal could delegate decision-making
authority directly to an agent, the optimal delegation set is a single inter-
val of decisions (Holmstrom 1977; Melumad and Shibano 1991; Alonso and
Matouschek 2008, hereafter, AM). Examples include budgeting on a man-
ager who is biased toward invest too much on a project, price caps on a
monopolist, etc. In this paper, we provide a characterization of the opti-
mal delegation mechanism in multi-tier hierarchies. It is shown that ceiling
strategy is optimal only when the intermediary is moderately biased. The
optimal set of permissible decisions may be a nite union of intervals. In
other words, some modest policy choices are deliberately discarded by the
principal, while extreme decisions are reserved. The "hole" in delegation
set arises as a principals control device to limit the possible distortion in
downstream delegation from an intermediary, whose preference opposes to
the agents, and gives rise to policy threshold e¤ects : "slight" changes in
the underlying state cause a jump in the policy responses.
In this hierarchy, only the agent could observe the state of the world
and undertake the decision. There are preference misalignment among all
players due to di¤erent intrinsic preferences, compensation package, or per-
sonal career concerns, etc.. Delegation is modeled as a sequential game. The
principal knows the biases of all subordinates, and o¤ers a set of permissible
decisions to an uninformed intermediary. The latter then exerts control by
specifying a set of options from which an agent may choose.1 In other words,
1If we allow the intermediary to choose ordering the informed agent after hearing from
him, i.e., cheap talk, then, as Dessein (2002) shows, under the standard specication,
delegation always dominates informative communication. Thus, cheap talk between the
intermediary and the agent cannot be a part of the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
outcome of this sequential delegation game. If the agent communicate with the interme-
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an intermediary could further shrink, but is unable to expand, the agents
choice set. The optimal delegation mechanism is an equilibrium outcome of
this game. To make the model tractable, we adopt the standard quadratic
utility specication as in Crawford and Sobel (1982, hereafter, CS).2
There are at least two di¤erent stories justifying the relevance of our se-
quential delegation game. First, a principal has limited commitment power
in that she can only promise to delegate to the immediate subordinate, and
put restrictions on the choice set. Thus, an intermediary plays a role in
delegation. This is related to the study of cheap talk game with partial com-
mitment power in Alonso and Matousheck (2007) and Kolotilin et al (2012).
Alternatively, if it is costly for a principal to verify an informed agents deci-
sions ex post due to time constraint or limited attentions, she may grant the
agent with the discretion within a specied menu of actions, and hire an in-
termediary who specializes in monitoring the agent. This intermediary could
overrule his decision within this choice set, e.g., take more strict stance in
supervision; but is unable to approve any actions beyond his choice set, e.g.,
it may be easy to observe over-spending. The principal could be the legisla-
ture or a company board, the agent could be investment banks, or a CEO,
and the intermediary may be the Securities and Exchange Commission, or
an external audit. As long as both the principal and the intermediary could
make some commitment, the spirit of this story is consistent with our delega-
tion game. In this story, an agent essentially is delegated by two asymmetric
principals who move sequentially. This interpretation is also related to the
work of Goltsman and Pavlov (2011) that studies the cheap talk game with
multiple receivers.
Whenever the subordinates have like biases, and the intermediary is mod-
erately biased, i.e., the intermediary is less restrictive than the principal, then
it is optimal for the principal to use ceiling strategy. The existence of an in-
termediary will not add any more distortion.3
However, when the subordinates have opposing biases, i.e., the interme-
diary is more restrictive than the principal, he wants to impose extra restric-
tions on the agents choice set. The principal and intermediarys disagree-
ment on delegation derives from their di¤erent ideal caps on the agents choice
diary, but the latter could commit to rubber-stamp the agents recommendations within
a specied set, then it is equivalent to that the intermediary delegates a set of decisions
to the agent, and the latter undertakes his preferred options within it.
2Quadratic utilities are convenient for obtaining rst-order conditions, but the intuition
for results does not depend on this. For more general payo¤ functions and priors, the
optimal delegation mechanism may still contain a hole.
3By Goltsman et al. (2009), interval delegation can attain the best outcome of an
universal mechanism.
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set. Thus, attempting to use single-interval delegation alone will result in the
at (or unresponsive in terms of AM) agents response for the realizations
of the extreme state. It is optimal to exclude some moderate actions from
the intermediarys choice set, in order to make the agents decision-making
partially responsive to the extreme state. By doing this, the principal can
limit the additional distortion from the biased intermediary. The essence
is similar to Melumad and Shibano (1991) and AM, though here the unre-
sponsiveness arises endogenously from the derived conict of interest. This
oppositely biased intermediary not only shrinks the agents choice set, but
also reduces the responsiveness for the realizations of the moderate and high
state. The restricted optimal delegation set involves an interval of delegated
decisions and a discrete option. This sheds light on policy overreaction, in
the sense that we observe big di¤erences in policy responses with respect to
"small" changes in the underlying state. For instance, small changes in the
extent of law violation would get quite di¤erent penalties.
There is a large body of literature on delegation. Dessein (2002) and
Ambrus et al. (2011) investigate delegation via an uninformed intermediary,
and suggest that under some conditions indirect delegation dominates direct
principal-agent delegation. However, they dont allow the intermediary to
make delegation decision, and by assuming noncontractible actions, Dessein
(2002) treats delegation as an "All-or-Nothing" choice, e.g., the principal can-
not restrict the subordinates choice set. Holmstrom (1977) uses mechanism-
design approach to study delegation under exogenous information structure,
and establishes the optimality of interval delegation. Goltsman et al. (2009)
further demonstrate that, by Holmstroms interval delegation, a principal can
implement the optimal universal mechanism (Myerson, 1982). Melumad and
Shibano (1991), Martimort and Semenov (2006), AM, Mylovanov (2008),
and Kovac and Mylovanov (2009) also characterize the conditions for the
optimality of interval delegation.
Tirole (1986) investigates a simple three-tier principal-supervisor-agent
hierarchy. In his work, a supervisor holds private information about the type
of agents, and the focus is the collusion between subordinates. He establishes
the equivalence between coalition-proof contract and giving ownership to a
supervisor, who subcontracts with a downstream agent. Prendergast (2002)
uses this framework to study customer complaint management mechanism.
Sequential delegation is a kind of subcontract, but di¤ering from these works,
monetary transfer is not allowed in this paper. Therefore, the equivalence
fails and subcontract can implement the optimal delegation outcome only
under certain conditions.
Some works have established the possibility of jump-discontinuity del-
egation rule. Melumad and Shibano (1991) show that when the principal
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and the agent have disparate sensitivities on preferred actions, it will be
optimal to have an one-jump discontinuity decision rule. AM use a com-
plicate numerical example to illustrate that the principal may remove some
intermediate options to encourage the agent to be more responsive, i.e., the
slope of the agents bias matters. In a two-dimension setting, Armstrong
and Vickers (2010) show that the optimal permission set may forbid some
desirable projects. On the other hand, Szalay (2005) demonstrates that to
motivate the agent to exert more e¤orts in information acquisition, it can be
optimal to preclude some compromised decisions. We extend these results
to three-player sequential delegation game, where the information structure
is exogenous, and the relative decision-making responsiveness to the state is
endogenized. In this work, a deliberately designed hole is the necessary in-
centive cost, and acts as a device to control (imperfectly) an overly-restrictive
intermediary (supervisor), instead of a biased informed agent.
This paper is organized as follows. In the following section we lay out
the basic model, and investigate the benchmark case of direct delegation,
which serves as the e¢ ciency criterion. Section 3 highlights the sequential
delegation, and characterizes the optimal delegation set, and demonstrates
that the holes in delegation set arise under opposing biases. Some extensions
are also discussed. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
A hierarchy is composed of three players: a principal (she, denote as player P
), an intermediary, and an agent (he, denote asM and A, respectively). The
utility of each player is of "quadratic loss function" in line with the classical
CS specication:4
U (; y; bi) =   (   y + bi)2 ; i = P;M;A (1)
Thus, their payo¤s depend on the true state  2   [0; 1], the action
undertaken y 2 Y  [0; 1], and their biases bi. Each player wants to respond
to the true state, but they have di¤erent ideal responses, e.g., is ideal action
is  + bi. Without loss of generality, we normalize bP = 0 and use bM , bA
to measure how nearly the subordinatesinterest coincide with that of the
principal. In most analysis we assume bA  0 and bM  bA,5 e.g., the agent
4Quadratic utilities are quite standard and extensively used in the literature, e.g.,
Krishna and Morgan (2001), Goltsman et al. (2009), Mylovanov (2008), Kovac and Mylo-
vanov (2009).
5In Section 3.3 we will discuss the more complicated composition of preferences, in-
cluding overly biased intermediary. It will show that the main insights still hold.
4
wants to exaggerate the need of fund, and the intermediary may be inclined
to him or prefer to take a stance more strict than the principal. All of these
are common knowledge among parties. We use Ui (; y) to refer the payo¤ of
player i.
P has the right to make decision, and only A would be informed about the
true state and choose the decision. But, he could not communicate directly
with P , neither P can allocate the authority directly to A. In other words,
M has the full control of the ow of information and commands between P
and A. We assume ex ante both P and M have the uniform prior over .
Now we specify the timing of this delegation game. P can only make
delegation decision one step downwardly. However, since M is uninformed,
he will further grant the informed agent with a menu of decisions. The timing
of this game is as follows:
1. P grants M with a closed set of permissible decisions YM  Y .
2. M allows A to select any action from a closed set YA  YM .
3. A privately observes the realizations of the state , and chooses a de-
cision y 2 YA.
In this sequential game, YM and YA are the control variables of P andM ,
respectively. Any set of delegated decisions delivered to A has to be subject
to the incentives of M .
It is noteworthy that this game admits multiple equilibria. Actually, there
are innite number of equilibrium since there are innite many redundant
decisions. These redundant decisions might be those that would never be
undertaken by A in stage 3, even if they are granted. For example, if bA 2
YA, then including or excluding any subset of [0; bA) does not a¤ect As
choice, since for A the action bA strictly dominates any choices lower than it.
Alternatively, redundant decisions might come fromMs delegating behavior
in stage 2. In equilibrium it might be of his interest to preclude some decisions
from YA. Hence, if P add to YM some decisions that would never be delegated
byM , this would not a¤ect YA. Therefore, in either way, expanding YM or YA
by adding arbitrary redundant decisions will not a¤ect Ps expected payo¤.
Therefore, we will concentrate on the implemented delegation set, the
minimal set of all delegation sets attaining the same equilibrium outcome.
With a little abuse of terminology, we use YA to refer the set of implementable
decisions that might be undertaken by A in equilibrium. For instance, the
implemented delegation set would only assign one action within the segment
of action [0; bA]. Any y < supfy jYA \ [0; bA]g is not an element of the imple-
mented delegation set. We also ignore Ms exclusion of redundant decisions
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in stage 2, thus in this equilibrium it should be YA = YM . Any other equi-
librium delegation sets are payo¤-equivalent to the implemented delegation
set.
2.1 Benchmark: direct delegation
We start from the benchmark case where the principal can contract with any
subordinates, e.g., she could costlessly verify the agents choice, or she has
complete commitment power. Because the intermediary has no additional
information, the principal would bypass him and directly delegate to the in-
formed agent. Goltsman et al. (2009) establish that the second-best optimal
outcome of an universal mechanism can be attained by the interval delega-
tion a la Holmstrom (1977). Thus, this delegation outcome will serve as the
e¢ ciency criterion.
Lemma 1 If P can directly delegate to the agent, then, the e¢ cient dele-
gation set Y  is [bA; 1  bA] if 0  bA  12 , and the implemented actions
are
y () =

 + bA, if  2 [0; 1  2bA]
1  bA, otherwise (2)
If bA > 12 , the e¢ cient delegation set consists of only Ps ex ante optimal
action 1
2
.
Proof. See Theorem 1 in Goltsman et al. (2009).
The e¢ cient delegation set of action is a single interval Y  = [bA; 1  bA],
which is determined by the preference misalignment between P and A. When
A is upwardly biased, he has the incentive to make decisions that are too large
from Ps perspective. As a response, P would remove the extremely high
actions by imposing a ceiling (1  bA). Optimal delegation seeks the balance
between the loss of control and the gain of e¢ ciency in decision-making. In
the low state, the latter e¤ect outweighs, thus A is allowed to act according
to his interest. In the high state, the former dominates. Consequently, P
keeps de facto control by imposing a ceiling.
Lemma 2 species the (local) properties of an optimal delegation set on
any subset of Y .
Lemma 2 In the direct P A delegation, suppose that the set of actions of
P is restricted to an interval, Y 0 = [y1; y2]  Y , then an optimal delegation
set on Y 0 is an interval of decisions, or one decision, or no decision.
Proof. See the Appendix A.
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Lemma 2 states that on any interval of Y , the optimal delegation set
assigns a connected set of decisions on it. In other words, the implemented
choice y () will be continuous on the corresponding segment of state [maxfy1 
bA; 0g;maxfy2; 0g]. Melumad and Shibano (1991) and AM have expressed the
similar result, based on slightly di¤erent assumptions of the model. While
Lemma 1 demonstrates that given an unrestricted set of options, interval del-
egation with a binding cap attains the e¢ cient outcome, Lemma 2 implies
that if the choice set available to P is an interval, then it is impossible that
P delegates a union of more than two intervals (points) of choices to A. This
lemma will signicantly simplify our analysis onMs delegation behavior. In
particular, the optimal delegation set under direct interactions would be a
single interval or a point.
3 Indirect Delegation
Now we turn to indirect delegation, where the principal has to delegate to the
intermediary and leave him with the discretion in sub-delegation. In other
words, the principal could not verify the agents choice, or she has limited
commitment power in that P could not commit to delegate directly to A.
Ms bias will inuence As choice set. We would use = bA bM to represent
the divergence of preference between A and M .
In the second stage,M acts as if a sub-principal within the choice set YM ,
and delegates based on . In the rst stage, P designs the delegation set as
the best response to her anticipated Ms downstream delegating behavior.
Thus, both  and bA a¤ect the optimal delegation set. As the rst step,
Lemma 3 studies the intermediarys delegating behavior in the second stage
by specifying the agents highest available alternative yA = maxfy : y 2 YAg,
conditional on that YM is an interval.
Lemma 3 If YM is an interval of decisions, then yA = minf1 +bM ; supfy jy 2 YM gg
Proof. See the Appendix A.
This lemma illustrates the impact of preference misalignment between
P and M . If M is delegated with extensive discretionary authority, unless
his preference coincides with the principals, i.e., bM = 0, he is inclined
to impose his ideal cap di¤erent from Ps ideal cap 1   bA. Actually, the
di¤erence between the ideal caps of P and M represents a kind of derived
conict of interest, which roots into their di¤erent inclination to restrict the
agents discretion.
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Section 3.1 demonstrates that whenever the subordinates are of like bi-
ases, and M is moderately biased, the single-interval delegation set is still
optimal. Section 3.2 points out that ceiling strategy is not optimal when
the subordinates are of opposing biases. The main reason is that since M
would like to impose a tighter bound on the agents decisions than would
be ex-ante optimal for the principal, As decision-making is not responsive
for high values of the state. Lemma 4 suggests that when an interval of in-
termediate decisions is exogenously removed, the optimal delegation set on
this restricted action space will be an union of an interval of options and
an isolated option. Then, Proposition 2 and 3 demonstrate that a principal
can optimally exclude some moderate decisions to make As decision-making
partially responsive to high realizations of the state. Proposition 4 states the
optimal delegation rule in this three-tier hierarchy. These results give rise
to observed policy threshold e¤ects. Section 3.3 discusses some extensions,
including other preferences composition, more complicate chains, etc..
3.1 Like biases
Werst examine the situation thatM is moderately biased, i.e., bA  bM  0.
Thus,  2 [0; bA], both subordinates are upwardly biased, but M is less
biased than A. Since 1 + bM  1  bA, M always prefer to expanding the
discretion of the agent. However, by Lemma 3 P could also eliminate this
loss by imposing a binding cap 1  bA on YM . Thus, her best outcome in (2)
would be attained in the hierarchy, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 1 If M and A have like biases and M is less biased, i.e., bA 
bM  0, then the optimal delegation rule of P is to impose a ceiling supfy jy 2 YM g =
1  bA, and the e¢ cient delegation set Y  can be implemented.
Proof. See the Appendix A.
This demonstrates that interval delegation is still optimal in a three-tier
hierarchy with moderately biased intermediary. In equilibrium, P imposes a
ceiling on Ms choice set YM , M then delivers all the remaining options, and
A nally picks up his preferred decision from YA. Besides, this proposition
says that the bias of M is irrelevant to the payo¤ of P as long as it lies
between Ps and As preferences. Therefore, there is no e¢ ciency loss from
adding a moderate intermediary.
3.2 Opposing biases
If A and M have opposing biases, i.e., bA  0  bM and  2

0; 1
2

, then we
have  > bA. A downwardly biased intermediary is interested in imposing a
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tighter ceiling (1 + bM) on YA than the e¢ cient ceiling (1  bA). Thus,
Lemma 3 says that it is impossible to attain Y  since yA  1   bA. From
the perspective of P , the superiors have the conict over delegating the de-
cisions within [1 + bM ; 1  bA]. Within this segment, P wants to give
A full discretion, while M wants to restrict A. The conict is derived from
the di¤erence in ideal caps. Thus, the more restrictive intermediary incurs
additional distortion on the principal. Remark 1 constructs an example to
illustrate that interval delegation sets are no longer optimal.
Remark 1 When A and M have opposing biases, i.e., bA  0  bM , interval
delegation is not optimal for P.
Proof. See the Appendix A.
Therefore, we should look at the optimal (restricted) delegation rule of
M to A, if the set of choices available to M is a given arbitrary subset of
[0; 1], e.g., a nite union of intervals. However, Remark 2 suggests that we
could concentrate on the union of two intervals of actions.
Remark 2 If bA  0  bM , under the optimal delegation rule, As imple-
mentable action y () is continuous for  2 [0; 1 + bM   bA] and  2
(1 + bM   bA; 1].
Proof. See the Appendix A.
Therefore, the optimal delegation rule of P prescribes that the inter-
sections of YA and the low and high segment of actions, respectively, are
connected sets. Hence, it is not in the interest of P that YM , as well as YA,
contain more than two intervals of implementable decisions. It turns out to
be su¢ cient to consider a union of two intervals as the candidates for optimal
delegation rules.
However, the connectedness property in Lemma 2 could not be extended
to the full space of decisions Y . If the principal attempts to use the single
interval delegation set a la Holmstrom, the upper-bound of YA shrinks, and
the agents decision-making would be unresponsive for high realizations of the
state  2 (1 + bM   bA; 1]. Therefore, by Remark 2 we could concentrate
on YM as a union of two intervals, in which some modest actions aroundMs
ideal ceiling might be removed.
How to implement a decision (partially) responsive to high values of the
state? In other words, how will an intermediary react to the removal of
decisions. Lemma 4 suggests that in a two-layer hierarchy, when the principal
is restricted in that her ideal cap becomes unavailable due to exogenous
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reasons, she will delegate a union of an interval of low actions and a single
high option.
Lemma 4 In the direct P A delegation, P would like to delegate at most
one action higher than 1 bA. If an interval of intermediate actions (x; 1  bA)
is removed from the available decisions, then the restricted optimal delega-
tion set is the union of an interval of low actions and a single high point.
Formally, YA = [bA; x] [ fzg, in which z = 1  bA.
Proof. see the Appendix A.
Under this restricted optimal delegation rule, A undertakes his preferred
choice  + bA whenever the realizations of state  lies within [0; x  bA]. For
 2 [x  bA; x+z2   bA], he undertakes the action x, while for  2 [x+z2   bA; 1],
he chooses the decision z.
From this lemma we know that any restricted optimal delegation set
should contain the interval [bA; x], where the loss from control is outweighed
by the gain in responsive decision-making. Furthermore, the principal will
discover it is optimal to add only one action greater than 1  bA, the upper
bound of the set of removed decisions. The reason is: a restricted principal
will delegate some high actions to compensate the loss of responsiveness in
the modest state. But, since in the range of the high state the agent wants
to undertake decisions that are too far from the principal, she would restrict
As discretion by delegating a single option. This lemma provides the key
insight on the shape of optimal delegation set in three-tier hierarchies with
oppositely biased subordinates.
P and M have the mutual interest in choosing the options corresponding
to the low state, and the conict of interest occurs only in the ideal response
to the high state. Because in the second stageM acts as if a principal within
YM , by Lemma 4, if P wants the decision-making to be more responsive to
the high state, she might need to preclude Ms ideal cap 1    + bM from
YM . Consequently, Ps delegation problem becomes designing a "hole" in YA.
Formally, P chooses the cap x of the interval of low actions and the discrete
decision z in YA, subject to that M has the incentive to deliver it to A. The
principals delegation problem can be stated as:
max
x;z
 
Z x bA
0
b2Ad  
Z x+z
2
 bA
x bA
(   x)2 d  
Z 1
x+z
2
 bA
(   z)2 d (3)
subject to
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bA  x  1 + bM (4)
 
Z x+z
2
 bA
x bA
(   x+ bM)2 d 
Z 1
x+z
2
 bA
(   z + bM)2 d   
Z 1
x bA
(   x+ bM)2 d
(5)
(3) is the principals objective function. Ps expected utility is the sum
of three parts: when the states are lower than x   bA, the agent can im-
plement his ideal options, so the distance between his action and Ps ideal
decision is a constant bA. When the state lies in the intermediate region, i.e.,
 2 x  bA; x+z2   bA, the agent strictly prefers to take decision x, and is
indi¤erent between x and z when  = x+z
2
  bA. When the state falls into the
high region, i.e.,  > x+z
2
  bA, the agent always takes the highest available
option z.
(4) is the boundary condition: the lower interval could not be too large,
e.g., x < 1    + bM . Otherwise, M will only delegate a single interval
[bA; 1 + bM ]. The constraint (5) is the incentive-compatible condition of
M : it is also in his interest to deliver the union of the lower interval [bA; x]
and the discrete high contingency z to A. These two inequalities represent
the cost to incentivize Ms delegating behavior, and ensure that it is Ms
best response to deliver YM to A. Lemma 5 below suggests that the optimal
delegation set prescribes that the cap of the lower interval and the single high
point should be symmetric around Ms ideal ceiling.
Lemma 5 Under the optimal delegation rule, z and x are symmetric around
1 + bM .
Proof. Analyzing (5) shows that the choice of z and x should satisfy the
jump condition:
1
2
(z + x)  1 + bM (6)
Because EUP is strictly increasing with x whenever (4) holds, which means
that once z is determined, P is always better o¤ by increasing the discretion
of M in the low state. Thus, (6) is always binding, and we can rewrite the
incentive-compatibility constraint (5) as
x = 2 (1  bA + 2bM)  z
i.e., z and x are symmetric around 1  bA + 2bM .
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Therefore, we could represent x and z in a more tractable way:
x = 1  bA + 2bM   , and z = 1  bA + 2bM + 
Thus,  represents the wedge between Ps choice variables and Ms ideal
cap.
Therefore, if we consider the outcome of this delegation game as a function
from the true state to the set of decisions, then this function admits at most
one discontinuity at  = 1 +bM bA, and this discontinuity must be a jump
discontinuity. Depend on whether the interval of low actions degenerates to
a single decision, Proposition 2 and 3 characterize this restricted optimal
delegation rule.
Proposition 2 If the subordinates have opposing biases, and the bias of the
intermediary is not too large, e.g., bM  bM  0  bA, then the optimal
implemented delegation set is
YA = [bA; 1  bA + 2bM   ] [ f1  bA + 2bM + g (7)
The optimal wedge is
 =  bA + 2bM +
q
2 (2bM   bA)2   b2A (8)
in which bM =
bA 
p
b2A bA+ 12
2
.
Proof. If the optimal delegation set can contain a lower interval, then we
substitute (6) into (3). The optimization problem is rewritten as
max

  b2A (1  2bA + 2bM   ) 
Z 1 2bA+2bM
1 2bA+2bM 
[   (1  bA + 2bM   )]2 d
 
Z 1
1 2bA+2bM
[   (1  bA + 2bM + )]2 d
By the rst-order condition, the optimal wedge is:
 =  bA + 2bM +
q
2 (2bM   bA)2   b2A
It is straightforward to verify that  is always non-negative.6 Thus, the op-
timal discrete contingency z is:
z = 1  2bA + 4bM +
q
2 (2bM   bA)2   b2A
6  0, (bA   2bM )2  b2A, which always hold for bM  0  bA.
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Consequently, the optimal cap of the lower interval is
x = 1 
q
2 (2bM   bA)2   b2A
(3) and (4) also impose further boundary conditions on the range of bA and
bM , namely:
x  bA and z  1
These guarantee that the lower interval contains more than one decision, and
the discrete high option is feasible.
Because
z  1, 2bA   4bM 
q
2 (2bM   bA)2   b2A
, 8b2M   8bAbM + 3b2A  0, 8

bM   bA
2
2
+ b2A  0
we have that z  1 always holds.
On the other hand,
x  bA , 1  bA 
q
2 (2bM   bA)2   b2A
, 8b2M   8bAbM   (1  2bA)  0
which requires that
bA +
q
b2A   bA + 12
2
 bM 
bA  
q
b2A   bA + 12
2
Dene bM  bA 
p
b2A bA+ 12
2
, because
bA+
p
b2A bA+ 12
2
 0, we have that when
bM  bM  0, YA = YM = [0; x] [ fzg.
Figure 1 illustrates the shape of the optimal delegation set when the inter-
mediary is more restrictive than the principal. In equilibrium, the principal
delegates to the intermediary with the choice set YM characterized by (7),
then the intermediary delivers this set to the agent, and lets the latter to
chose his preferred options from this set.
Figure 1 here
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Proposition 2 describes that when a downwardly biased intermediary is
not too biased, the optimal delegation set contains an interval of low de-
cisions. However, if the intermediary is further biased from the principal,
then the optimal delegation rule of P may degenerate to a set of two discrete
decisions, e.g., "accept" and "reject", as the following proposition illustrates.
Proposition 3 If the intermediary is very downwardly biased, e.g., maxfbM ; bA 
1
2
g  bM  bM , then the optimal implemented delegation set contains two de-
cisions, namely
YA = f1  bA + 2bM   g [ f1  bA + 2bM + g (9)
The optimal wedge is
 =
1
2
  2 (2bA   1) bM + 4b2M   bA (10)
in which bM =
bA 
p
b2A+
1
2
2
.
If bM  maxfbM ; bA   12g, then YA = f12g.
Therefore, when the subordinates have opposing biases, the multi-interval
delegation set arises as the optimal one due to incentive costs, and serves as a
device to control the intermediarys sub-delegation behavior. This exclusion
of modest actions in e¤ect maintains the e¤ective use of information in the
bottom state, and improves the responsiveness in the high state, on the
expense of loss of the use of information in the modest state.
The jump discontinuity gives rise to policy threshold e¤ects: small changes
in the state around a certain threshold level has dramatic impacts on the
policy response. With opposing biased subordinates, the threshold level is
Ms ideal cap 1   bA + 2bM . As Proposition 2 and 3 show, the variation of
policy response will be 2.
In contrast with the case of like biased subordinates, a downwardly biased
intermediary entails additional distortion on the principal. In particular,
compare with the direct delegation, the agent not only has less decisions
available, but also chooses worse responses for the realizations of the high
state, as the following corollary demonstrates.
Corollary 1 When the subordinates are of opposing biases, the high contin-
gency z  1   bA. And a less biased intermediary can increase the agents
discretionary authority.
Proof. See the Appendix A
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Under the direct delegation, the highest option available to A is 1  
bA. When M is less restrictive than P , this decision is still implementable,
as Proposition 1 shows. However, when M is more restrictive, the highest
implementable decision z is lower than 1  bA. Thus, responsiveness to the
high state is also partially sacriced.
The less biased M is, the fewer modest options needed to be precluded.
In other words, the greater preference misalignment among subordinates, the
smaller the hole, and the larger policy threshold e¤ects. It is noteworthy that
the wedge  disappears (x = z = 1 bA) only if bM = 0, i.e., P will delegate
M with an interval of decisions only if he is neutral. Thus, interval delegation
is a limit case in a multi-tier hierarchy. We summarize an equilibrium in the
sequential delegation game here.
Summary 1 In this principal-intermediary-agent delegation game, in equi-
librium, the principals strategies are:
1. If  2 [0; bA], she delegates all options within [bA; 1  bA] to the inter-
mediary
2. If  2 bA; 12, she species an unconnected choice set YM (as in (7)
and (9)) from which the intermediary may choose;
For the intermediary, it is his best response to deliver all the remaining
decisions in YM to the agent. Then, the informed agent selects his ideal
action within this choice set.
Figure 2 illustrates the features of the optimal delegation rule in Summary
1, conditional on the subordinatesbiases. When the combination of subor-
dinatesbiases falls into the upper shadow triangle, e.g., the intermediary is
less restrictive than the principal, interval delegation is optimal. When the
intermediary is more restrictive than the principal, but not too restrictive,
the optimal implemented delegation set contains an interval of low decisions
and a high single point. If the intermediary is quite restrictive, e.g., his bias
lies into the lower shadow triangle, then it is optimal for the principal to
delegate only two implementable options. Moreover, if the intermediary is
too restrictive, then delegation becomes trivial in that the principal would
allow the subordinates to undertake only one action.
Figure 2 here
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3.3 Extensions
So far, we only consider the situation that the intermediary is moderately
biased or downwardly biased, e.g.,   0. However, it is also possible that
 < 0, namely M is overly-biased. In Appendix B we show that a hole
is still involved in the optimal delegation mechanism with an over-biased
intermediary. As in Lemma 1 and 2, the optimal delegation rule prescribes
ceiling the agents choice set against the direction of bias. Thus, it is optimal
for M to restrict YA by imposing a bottom, and P still caps As discretion
in the high state. Again, P removes decisions only in the direction where
the derived conict of interest between superiors exists. Since M wants to
expand the agents discretion in the high state, P still imposes a cap. On the
other hand, becauseM has an additional ideal bottom when delegating to A,
P can remove some options around this bottom from YM . Consequently, it
is in Ms best interest to delegate the remaining implementable decisions to
A. The optimal delegation set is a union of a low single point and an interval
of moderate decisions. In summary, when the intermediary is overly-biased,
we still have the multi-interval delegation set, and the policy threshold e¤ect
occurs in the low state.
A chain is an abstract of hierarchies in the real world. If we have a
multiple branch hierarchy, e.g., a tree, however, our analysis still applies
as long as there is no payo¤ interdependence among di¤erent branches of
subordinates. Then, the principal can take each branch as a chain, and design
the optimal delegation rule conditional on the biases of the members on that
branch. Thus, the restricted optimal delegation mechanism characterized in
Proposition 2 and 3 still holds, and policy threshold e¤ects remain.
The basic trade-o¤ in a three-tier hierarchy continues in the optimal de-
sign of delegation rule in a chain with arbitrary depth. If all subordinates
have like biases, and all intermediariesbiases are between the bottom-level
agent and the principal, e.g., every intermediary is less restrictive than his
immediate superior, then a principal can employ the approach described in
Proposition 1. By imposing an appropriate cap conditional on bA, hierarchies
will have the same extent of responsibility delegated at the bottom level as
that in a two-tier hierarchy. Thus, single-interval delegation is still optimal.
Otherwise, a principal has to take into account each subordinates direction
of bias. Again, it is optimal for her to keep the subordinatesdiscretion in the
range of mutual interests, and exclude the decisions around the thresholds in
the direction of derived conict of interest. Some intermediaries may want
to impose extra restrictions on the low state, and some may prefer taking
more strict stance for the realizations of the high state. However, as Lemma
4 shows, any (sub-)principal only wants to implement at most one action
16
higher (lower) than her ideal cap (bottom). Moreover, there are at most two
directions of conict of interest on this one-dimension state space. Therefore,
the optimal delegation set is a union of at most three interval of actions: a
low single point, an interval of intermediate decisions possibly degenerating
into a single point, and a high single point. In equilibrium, policy threshold
e¤ects become more salient since there are two thresholds now, and multiple
intermediaries entail more distortion on the principal. In summary: when
all intermediaries are moderately biased, interval delegation remains the op-
timal; otherwise, the optimal delegation set involves one or two holes, and
policy threshold e¤ects exist.
Therefore, when hierarchies become more complicated, the principals
loss weakly increases, the optimal delegation rule has more holes, and policy
threshold e¤ects are more salient. In e¤ect, this doesnt require that the
principal has very precise knowledge of the subordinatesbiases. If she ex-
pects that ex post, the intermediariesresponses may be distorted towards
the direction opposing to the agents ideal action, she will still exclude some
modest decisions against this distortion.
4 Conclusion
This paper contributes by providing a complete characterization of the opti-
mal delegation rule in a multi-tier hierarchy. We show that as the response to
the distortion caused by a biased intermediary, a principal may exclude some
moderate options from the set of delegated decisions. The optimal delegation
set contains an interval of decisions of the mutual interest among superiors,
and precludes the options around a certain threshold, which is determined
by the direction of derived conict of interest among superiors. Thus, there
may exist optimal delegation sets that are not connected.
Our paper doesnt touch the very interesting question on the design
of optimal hierarchies. This has received considerable attentions in litera-
tures which mainly aims at explaining the reasons for hierarchies, including
bounded rationality or information processing costs (Geanakoplos and Mil-
grom, 1991; Radner, 1993), heterogenous knowledge (Garicano, 2000) or
conicts over hiring and promotion decisions (Friebel and Raith, 2004), etc..
However, as long as hierarchies are formed based on considerations beyond
the strategic use of information, our results on the design of optimal delega-
tion within hierarchies still hold.
In this paper, we only analyze delegation in hierarchies. It will be in-
teresting to compare delegation with communication in hierarchies, e.g., the
principal chooses decisions after hearing reports from the agent via a strate-
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gic intermediary. Previous studies establish that an opposing biased inter-
mediary may improve communication e¢ ciency (Ivanov, 2010, Ambrus et al.
2013). Investigating whether delegation always dominates communication
even with opposing biased subordinates may provide new insights about the
value of delegation. A more interesting direction will be combining skip-level
communication with sequential delegation, e.g., the bottom-level agent has
the opportunity to skip his immediate superiors and report directly to the
top-level principal. This may signicantly change the shape of implemented
delegation set. We leave these promising research directions for future stud-
ies.
A Appendix A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Lets denote the intersection of the optimal delegation set and the interval
Y 0 as 	. Suppose that 	 is not a connected set. Then, there exists at least
one interval of decisions (t  ; t+ )  [y1; y2], in which   0, such that
t  ; t+  2 	 but (t  ; t+ )  	. It su¢ ces to show that the principal
has the incentive to add the segment of decisions (t  ; t+ ) to 	.
1. If t +  < bA, then, the decisions within this interval are redundant,
and we would not change the principals expected payo¤ by adding the
interval (t  ; t+ ) to 	.
2. If t    bA, because (t  ; t+ )  	, A will chooses
y ()=

t , if  2 [t    bA; t  bA]
t+ , if  2 [t  bA; t+   bA]
We now show that by decreasing  to some ! we increase Ps expected
payo¤ in contradiction to the assumed optimality of 	. This varia-
tion would not a¤ect Ps payo¤ on any segment of the state outside
[t    bA; t+   bA], but create two new subsegments of the state
(t   bA; t !  bA] and [t+!  bA; t+  bA), ! 2 [0; ], in which A
chooses y = + bA. Ps expected payo¤ on  2 (t    bA; t+   bA)
is, then,
 
Z t ! bA
t  bA
(bA)
2 d 
Z t bA
t ! bA
[   (t  !)]2 d 
Z t+! bA
t bA
[   (t+ !)]2 d
 
Z t+ bA
t+! bA
(bA)
2 d
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The rst derivative with respect to ! is  2!2. This derivative is neg-
ative. Thus, given that ! 2 [0; ], the optimal ! = 0; that is, Ps
expected payo¤ increases by adding to 	 the interval of actions previ-
ously precluded.
3. Finally, if t  < bA  t+, we continue creating the variation stated
above. We divide our discussion of the new subsegments into three
cases:
 If for the new subsegments we have t + ! < bA, then A chooses
y =  + bA for the state  2 [0; t+   bA]. Hence, reducing !
further to zero would not a¤ect Ps expected payo¤.
 If the new segments are characterized by t ! < bA  t+!, then
A chooses y = t   ! for  2 [0;maxft  bA; 0g], y = t + ! for
 2 [maxft  bA; 0g; t+ !   bA], and y =  + bA for  2 [t + !  
bA; t+   bA). Ps expected payo¤ on  2 [0; t+   bA) is
 
Z max ft bA;0g
0
[  (t  !)]2 d 
Z t+! bA
max ft bA;0g
[  (t+ !)]2 d 
Z t+ bA
t+! bA
(bA)
2 d
The derivative with respect to ! is   (t+ !)2 + b2A if t   bA < 0,
and  2!2   b2A + (t  !)2 otherwise. Both are negative. Thus, it
is still optimal to set ! = 0.
 If the lower new subsegment has t   !  bA, then Ps expected
payo¤ on  2 [0; t+   bA) is
 
Z t ! bA
0
(bA)
2 d 
Z t bA
t ! bA
[  (t  !)]2 d 
Z t+! bA
t bA
[  (t+ !)]2 d
 
Z t+ bA
t+! bA
(bA)
2 d
And the derivative with respect to ! is  2!2, which is negative.
Again, it is optimal to further reduce ! to zero.
Therefore, the improvement in Ps expected payo¤ by adding to 	 the
new subsegments (t      bA; t   !   bA] and [t + !   bA; t +    bA) is in
contradiction to the assumed optimality of 	. So 	 has to be a connected
set.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
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Since YA  YM , the highest action available to the agent, yA, can not
exceed the highest action in YM . On the other hand, if the intermediary is
delegated with an unrestricted set of decisions, e.g., YM = Y , then he acts
as if a sub-principal within YM . By Lemma 1, he could attain his best payo¤
by imposing an ideal cap minf1; 1    + bMg. Since YM  Y  [0; 1], we
have the results.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
By Lemma 2, we know that the optimal delegation set assigns an interval
or a point on any interval of actions. Since 1 +bM  1 bA, by Lemma 3,
if [bA; 1 + bM ]  YM , M could implement his best outcome. Therefore,
when P imposes the cap 1   bA on Ms choice set, by Lemma 3 M has the
inclination to delegate all available decisions lower than 1  bA to A, exactly
the same outcome as Y  prescribed.
PROOF OF REMARK 1
We will prove it by constructing a contradiction. Suppose that the interval
delegation is the optimal. By Lemma 3 we know that the highest available
action to A, if YM is an interval, is 1    + bM . Hence, interval delegation
leads to Y IA = [bA; 1 + bM ]. Ps highest expected payo¤when delegating
an interval of decisions thus is
EU IP =  
Z 1 +bM bA
0
b2Ad  
Z 1
1 +bM bA
[   (1 + bM)]2 d
Now we construct a variation of this delegation rule. The alternative is a
union of two disconnected action sets
Y "A = [bA; 1 + bM   "] [ f1 + bM + "g
in which "  0. The expected payo¤ to P is
EU "P =  
Z 1 +bM bA "
0
b2Ad  
Z 1 +bM bA
1 +bM bA "
[   (1 + bM   ")]2 d
 
Z 1
1 +bM bA
[   (1 + bM + ")]2 d
The rst derivative of EU "P with respect to " is
@EU "P
@"
=  b2A   2+ (  bM   ")2
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By denition EU "P = EU
I
P when  = 0. Lets consider the situation
bM < 0, then we have   bM > bA. Hence @EU
"
P
@"
> 0 when " = 0. This im-
plies that there exists a  > 0 such that for " 2 [0; ], we have EU "P > EU IP .
Therefore, compared with the new disconnected delegation set Y "A, Ps ex-
pected payo¤ is strictly lower under the interval delegation set Y IA .
Besides, this new delegation set Y "A also satises the jump condition in
(6). Hence, it is in Ms interest to deliver Y "A to A. Therefore, the higher
expected payo¤ under Y "A is in the contradiction to the assumed optimality
of Y IA .
PROOF OF REMARK 2
We need to show that the optimal delegation set YA has to prescribe that
y () is continuous on both [0; 1 + bM   bA] and (1    + bM   bA; 1],
respectively.
By Lemma 1, it is in the best interest of the downwardly biased M to
cap As discretion on his ideal ceiling 1 + bM . Mathematically, we have
the intersection YM \ [0; 1 + bM ] = YA \ [0; 1 + bM ].
Moreover, suppose that in equilibrium YA \ [0; 1 + bM ] is a nite
union of intervals, e.g., As choice y () is discontinuous at some interior
points  2 [0; 1    + bM   bA]. By Lemma 2, we have that Ms expected
payo¤ increases by adding these discontinuities to YA. Since 1   + bM <
1   bA, including these discontinuities is also in the best interest of P . The
improvement by this variation is in contradiction to the assumed optimality
of a disconnected delegation set on this range. Therefore, we have that the
intersection YA \ [0; 1 + bM ] is a connected set.
Similarly, for the set of decisions (1 + bM ; 1], M prefers to reduce As
discretion for the corresponding range of state. If the implemented delega-
tion set YA may contain more than one intervals on the range (1 +bM ; 1],
then it would be in P and Ms mutual interest to include all the actions
between the intervals into YA. Again, it is in contradiction to the assumed
optimality of the original delegation set. The implementable choice y () thus
is continuous on the corresponding segment of state (1    + bM   bA; 1].
Hence we reach the conclusion we want.
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
We divide the proof into four parts. Part 1 shows that if Ps action set is
constrained to interval [0; x] with x  1  bA, then the optimal delegation set
has form [bA; y2] on it. Part 2 shows that if Ps action set is constrained to
[1  bA; 1], then the optimal delegation set assigns a singleton fzg on it. Part
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3 establishes that for action sets [0; x] and [1  bA; 1] the optimal delegation
set have forms, respectively, [bA; x] and fzg, in which z = 1  bA. Finally,
Part 4 demonstrates that delegating a union of the two dominates delegating
only an interval. Hence, the optimal delegation set is also the union of an
interval and a point on the union of the two action sets [0; x] [ [1  bA; 1].
1. First, by Lemma 2, we know that the intersection of the optimal delega-
tion set and [0; x] has to be a connected set. Thus, we can concentrate
on the form of an interval or a point. Suppose the choice set on this
segment is an interval of options [y1; y2]  [0; x], and y1  bA. We
need to show that for any xed higher endpoint y2, it is optimal for P
to reduce the implementable y1 to bA. Since the change in y1 will not
a¤ect Ps payo¤ for any state  > y2   bA, we can focus on Ps payo¤
on the interval of the state [0; y2   bA] alone. A will undertake y1 for
any state   y1   bA, and choose  + bA for  2 (y1   bA; y2   bA].
Hence, Ps payo¤ on this interval is
 
Z y1 bA
0
(   y1)2 d 
Z y2 bA
y1 bA
b2Ad =
b3A
3
 y
3
1
3
 b2A (y2   y1)
The derivative with respect to y1 shows that the maximum is attained
when y1 = bA.
2. Then we look at the optimal delegation set on the choice set [1  bA; 1].
By Lemma 2, it has to be a connected set. We start from supposing it
is an interval [y3; y4], then we need to show that it is optimal for P to
shrink this interval into a single point, namely, y3 = y4. The expected
payo¤ of P for  2 y2+y3
2
  bA; 1

under the delegation set [y3; y4] is
 
Z y3 bA
y2+y3
2
 bA
(   y3)2 d 
Z y4 bA
y3 bA
b2Ad 
Z 1
y4 bA
(   y4)2 d
=  1
3

y2   y3
2
  bA
3
  b2A (y4   y3) 
(1  y4)3
3
The rst derivative with respect to y4 is  b2A + (1  y4)2 ; since y4 
y3  1 bA, it is negative. Therefore, P strictly benets from shrinking
the upper bound of the interval of the high decisions, she would delegate
at most one action within the action set [1  bA; 1].
3. Now we know that for action sets [0; x] and [1  bA; 1], the restricted
optimal delegation set takes the forms, respectively, [bA; y2] and fzg.
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We need to show that y2 = x and look for the analytical form of z. Ps
expected payo¤ under the delegation set [bA; y2] [ fzg is
EUP =  b2A (y2   bA) 
1
3
[2

z   y2
2
3
+ 6

z   y2
2

b2A
+b3A + (1  z)3]
Since @EUP
@y2
=
 
z y2
2
2  0, P always wants to increase y2 till the higher
endpoint x, so y2 = x. Moreover, since
@EUP
@z
=  

z   y2
2
2
  b2A + (1  z)2
and
@2EUP
@z2
=
3z + y2   4
2
< 0
we know that
@EUP
@z
z=1 bA =  (bA + y2   1)24 < 0
Thus, the solution z to the maximization problem with the constraint
z  1  bA is z = 1  bA.
4. Step 3 has shown that [bA; x][fzg is the optimal among all delegation
sets with the form [y1; y2] [ [y3; y4]. As the nal step, we need to show
that [bA; x][fzg dominates any other possible delegation sets. Because
of Remark 2, the optimal delegation sets which consists no more than
two intervals of implementable delegated decisions. Therefore, we only
need to show that Ps expected payo¤under the delegation set [bA; x][
fzg is higher than that under the single-interval delegation set [0; x].
Ps expected payo¤ under the union of action sets is
EU
[0;x][fzg
P =  b2A (x  bA) 
1
3
[2

1  bA   x
2
3
+6

1  bA   x
2

b2A+2b
3
A]
On the other hand, if the delegation set is [0; x], Ps expected payo¤ is
EU
[0;x]
P =  
Z x bA
0
b2Ad 
Z 1
x bA
(   x)2 d =  b2A (x  bA) 
1
3

(1  x)3 + b2A

Therefore, it su¢ ces to show that EU [0;x][fz
g
P   EU [0;x]P  0 for any
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x  1   bA. In other words, we need to demonstrate that for any
x  1  bA, we have
2

1  bA   x
2
3
+ 6

1  bA   x
2

b2A + b
3
A   (1  x)3  0
Because the rst derivative of the LHS with respect to x is
 3
"
1  bA   x
2
2
  (1  x)2 + b2A
#
Denote x = 1  bA   " where "  0, we have the terms in the bracket
as
 
"
2
2   (bA + ")2 + b2A, which is negative. Hence, we have @LHS@x  0
for any x  1  bA. Besides, when x = 1  bA, the LHS turns out to be
0, i.e., EU [0;x][fz
g
P = EU
[0;x]
P . Therefore, we have
EU
[0;x][fzg
P   EU [0;x]P  0, 8x  1  bA
Hence, for P delegating the union of an interval and a point dominates
interval delegation.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
If x  bA fails, e.g., bM  bM , then there is no interval of implementable
decisions in YA. Consequently, the ideal decisions of A is not available even
in the lowest state ( = 0). Hence, P picks up two decisions x and z, which
corresponding to the low states and the high states, respectively, to maximize
(3), which is modied as
max
x;z
 
Z x+z
2
 bA
0
(   x)2 d  
Z 1
x+z
2
 bA
(   z)2 d (11)
To ensure that fxg [ fzg will be delivered to A, we need the incentive
compatibility constraint:
 
Z x+z
2
 bA
0
(   x+ bM)2 d  
Z 1
x+z
2
 bA
(   z + bM)2 d
 maxf 
Z 1
0
(   x+ bM)2 d; 
Z 1
0
(   z + bM)2 dg
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This constraint says that M would not further shrink the two-action
delegation set to a singleton. Tedious calculation shows that any x and z
satisfying 2bA  z + x  2  2bA + 4bM will satisfy this constraint. Because
the payo¤ in (11) is increasing with respect to x, P can choose any x and z
satisfying the same jump condition (6) to maximize the new objective func-
tion (11). Hence, we can rewrite
x = 1  bA + 2bM    and z = 1  bA + 2bM + 
We substitute it into (11), and derive the rst-order condition, then we
have the optimal wedge
 =
1
2
  2 (2bA   1) bM + 4b2M   bA
We need that   0. Furthermore, to guarantee that two-action delega-
tion set is feasible, we need 0  x  z  1:
First, we have
 =
1
2
  2 (2bA   1) bM + 4b2M   bA
= 4
"
b2M +
(1  2bA) bM
2
+
(1  2bA)2
16
#
  (1  2bA)
2
4
+
1  2bA
2
= 4

bM +
(1  2bA)
4
2
+
1  2bA
2

1  1  2bA
2

 0
The last inequality uses the fact that bA 2

0; 1
2

.
Then, we check whether x  0. Substitute  into the expression of x,
we nd out that this needs
bA  
q
b2A +
1
2
2
 bM 
bA +
q
b2A +
1
2
2
On the other hand, z  1 requires that
bA   1 
q
b2A +
1
2
2
 bM 
bA   1 +
q
b2A +
1
2
2
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Obviously,
bA 1 
p
b2A+
1
2
2
 bA 
p
b2A+
1
2
2
, dene bM  bA 
p
b2A+
1
2
2
, we need
bM  bM to ensure that x; z 2 [0; 1]. Moreover, since
bM 
bA   1 +
q
b2A +
1
2
2

bA +
q
b2A +
1
2
2
always holds, we could conclude that when bM 2

bM ; bM

, two-action
delegation set is feasible.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
1. Since bM  0, from (8), its straightforward to see that @@bM  0.
Therefore, when the delegation set contains an interval of decisions,
the bigger bM , the smaller the wedge .
2. Then we turn to (10). Here @
@bM
 0 if bM   1 2bA4 . However, since
bA 2

0; 1
2

,  1 2bA
4
 bM always holds, we still have for bM  bM  bM ,
a less biased M reduces the wedge.
Therefore, we can conclude that when M is less downwardly biased,
the scope of the agents discretion widens.
B Appendix B
In this section we will briey describe the optimal delegation mechanism
when bM  bA  0.
By Lemma 1, we know that an unrestricted overly-biased intermediary
would like to impose a bottom bM  on the agents choice set, while the prin-
cipal would only impose a ceiling 1  bA. Hence, there exists the derived con-
ict of interest in the high state [1  bA; 1] and the low state [0; 2(bM   bA)].
SinceM would like to expand As discretion for the segment of the high state,
P could still attain her ideal cap. However, because compared with P , M
wants to take more strict stance in the segment of the low state, the decision-
making becomes at for the realizations of the low state. Therefore, we could
still concentrate on the delegation set with the form [0; 2bM   bA][ [x; 1]. To
demonstrate the optimality of a hole, we only need to prove that when the
agent is downwardly biased, and some modest actions are ruled out, then it
is optimal to include a low action in the delegation set.
As an analogue to Lemma 4, we establish the following lemma on the
behavior of a restricted principal with a downwardly biased agent.
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Lemma 6 In P A direct delegation, if bA  0, and an interval of inter-
mediate actions ( bA; x) is removed from the available decisions, then the
restricted optimal delegation set is fzg [ [x; 1], in which z =  bA.
Problem 2 Still, by Lemma 2 and Remark 2, the restricted optimal delega-
tion set will be a union of two connected sets, e.g., the optimal delegation set
admits at most one discontinuity. Thus, we assume that YA takes the form
[y1; y2] [ [y3; y4], in which y2   bA  x  y3. Ps expected payo¤ would be
EUP =  
Z y1 bA
0
(   y1)2 d  
Z y2 bA
y1 bA
b2Ad  
Z y2+y3
2
 bA
y2 bA
(   y2)2 d
 
Z y3 bA
y2+y3
2
 bA
(   y3)2 d  
Z y4 bA
y3 bA
b2Ad  
Z 1
y4 bA
(   y4)2 d
=  1
3

( bA)3   ( y1)3
  b2A (y2   y1 + y4   y3)  13
"
y3   y2
2
  bA
3
  ( bA)3
#
 1
3
"
( bA)3  

y2   y3
2
  bA
3#
  1
3

(1  y4)3   ( bA)3

Take the rst derivatives of EUP with respect to y1; y2; y3; y4, respectively, we
have
@EUP
@y1
= b2A   y21  0
@EUP
@y2
=

y3   y2
2
2
 0
@EUP
@y3
=  

y3   y2
2
2
 0
@EUP
@y4
= (1  y4)2   b2A  0
Therefore, we have the optimal y1 = y2 = z =  bA, and y3 = x, y4 = 1. The
restricted optimal delegation set turns out to be a union of a low singleton
and an interval of high options.
This lemma has implications for the sub-delegation behavior of the overly-
biased intermediary, given that YM is a union of two intervals. It is easy to
proceed to the principals delegation problem with an overly-biased interme-
diary. Similar to Proposition 2, the principal would impose the low action z
and the lower endpoint of the interval x. Besides, the principal would still
impose the cap 1  bA.
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Figure 1. Optimal delegation set with opposing biased subordinates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 The features of optimal delegation set when M Ab b  
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